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Abstract 
This paper explores a tension in deliberative democratic theory. The tension consists in that 
deliberative opinion-formation ideally aims to reach consensus, while a consensus, once 
established, will likely impede the conditions for further rational public discourse. Hence, over 
time, deliberative democracy might risk undermining itself. While the tension is demonstrable 
in theory, we also suggest three cognitive and socio-psychological mechanisms by which 
consensus might hamper the rationality of public discourse: after an agreement, participants 
cease to develop new arguments, they tend to forget existing arguments, and their fear of 
deviating from the social norm promotes conformism. Existing research has largely neglected to 
study how consensus in decision-making affects future public deliberation. Our paper thus 
serves three purposes: To elaborate the consensus paradox in deliberative democratic theory, to 
open up a research agenda for examining the paradox empirically, and to assess the theoretical 
implications of the paradox. 
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Introduction 
Over the past two decades, the idea of deliberative democracy has gained wide attention 
among political researchers as well as in the broader public. Theories of deliberative democracy 
assume that democratic processes of will- and opinion-formation aim to reach an informed, 
rational agreement among all affected parties and that public deliberation leads to better 
decisions than alternative procedures, since everyone gets to express their opinion on the matter 
and since different opinions are subject to open scrutiny, so that the better argument triumphs. 
However, if deliberation aims to reach a rationally grounded consensual agreement, what 
happens to deliberation once that aim has been attained? Reaching a closure does not put an end 
to the need for further argument, but, we shall argue in this paper, it may impinge on the 
preconditions for future rational discourse. As such, closure implies that parties decrease or halt 
their deliberative activities, if only temporarily. The more such a closure approximates the ideal 
of consensus, however, the worse the conditions are likely to be for resuming deliberation at a 
later point in time. For instance, theorists emphasise that deliberative democracy is multi-
perspectival, expressing a diversity of views and opinions (Bohman 2003) and that 
disagreement is vital because it forces those who deliberate to form better reasoned opinions 
(Price, Cappella, and Nir 2002). But to the extent that deliberating parties successfully reach 
consensus, fewer opinions and less disagreement will be represented in their future deliberation. 
Thus, a consensus agreement might undermine the conditions for rational deliberation. This, we 
argue, represents a puzzling tension, or even a paradox, in deliberative democratic theory: How 
to reconcile, over time, the ideal of a rational consensual closure with the ideal of lively, on-
going public deliberation? 
This paper proceeds in three steps: First, we detail why deliberative democratic theory 
may entail a tension between consensual closure and deliberative disagreement. We also suggest 
three causal mechanisms, grounded in cognitive and social psychology, to support the claim that 
actual public discourses could produce the paradoxical result we identify in deliberative 
  
democratic theory. Second, building on existing scholarship, we suggest research designs by 
which the consensus paradox could be studied empirically in both experiments and real-world 
public discourse, for instance in parliaments. Third, we reflect on what the consensus paradox 
implies for deliberative democratic theory and practice, and propose ways in which a 
deliberative procedure could seek to avoid becoming a victim of its own success. 
The contested role of consensus in deliberative democracy 
As deliberative democracy has matured as a research program, the ideal of consensus has 
been a central topic of debate (Bächtiger et al. 2010; Chambers 2003; Elstub 2010). Process-
oriented theories of deliberation emphasize rational consensus on validity claims as the ideally 
preferable outcome of public discourse. Joshua Cohen (1998, 199) stresses that deliberation 
should aim ‘to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus,’ arguing that ‘public reasoning itself 
can help to reduce the diversity of politically relevant preferences because such preferences are 
shaped and even formed in the process of reasoning itself’. In his oft-cited statement of the ideal 
deliberative procedure, Cohen (1989) claims that ‘[o]utcomes are democratically legitimate if 
and only if they could be the object of free and reasoned agreement among equals’. Also, Jürgen 
Habermas (1988; 1996) makes the ideal of a rational consensus the touchstone of his discursive 
theory of democracy. On this deliberative account, democratic decisions derive their legitimacy 
not simply from counting votes as expressions of preferences formed prior to political 
interaction, but from the sincere, reasoned unanimity among all affected parties. Participants 
reach such unanimity, or consensus, when they become convinced that a decision or a course of 
action is desirable through deliberation under conditions where the best argument wins. 
Critics, however, have disputed consensus as an ideal outcome of deliberative procedures. 
Agonist and difference democrats, who accept few of the basic tenets of deliberative theory, 
have argued that consensus as an ideal of democratic interchange is both impossible and 
dangerous (Markell 1997). Consensus is unattainable or unlikely due to the facts of value 
pluralism in modern societies and the incommensurability of normative and epistemic 
  
frameworks (Valadez 2001). Moreover, consensus is politically perilous, because it violates this 
plurality and might serve to oppress or exclude certain interests, ideas and identities (Young 
2001). For instance, Chantal Mouffe (1995) warns that seeking to eradicate all political 
antagonism while aiming for a universal rational consensus is ‘the real threat to democracy.’ 
Taking on this challenge, theorists have sought to make the ideal of democratic 
deliberation more feasible under real circumstances, in societies characterised by social 
inequality and cultural diversity (Elstub 2010). Consequently, deliberative theory ‘has moved 
away from a consensus-centered teleology’ (Chambers 2003) to develop alternative notions of 
legitimate outcomes of deliberation. Even Habermas (1996, 165ff), for instance, concedes that 
where there is no hope of reaching a rational consensus, bargaining and compromise are 
acceptable outcomes, legitimate to the extent that they can be tested in moral discourse. 
Likewise, Bohman (1996, 89) suggests that where strong consensus is unattainable, parties may 
be able to reach plural agreement (or moral compromise), ‘which merely requires continued 
cooperation in public deliberation, even with persistent disagreements’, similar to Gutmann & 
Thompson’s (1996, 73) notion of deliberative disagreement, ‘in which citizens continue to 
differ about basic moral principles even though they seek a resolution that is mutually 
justifiable.’ More recently, Niemeyer & Dryzek (2007) suggest meta-consensus, i.e., agreement 
on the issue at hand, but not necessarily on the actual outcome, as an ideal deliberative end, 
Moore & O’Doherty (2012) develop a related notion of ‘apparent consensus’ as an acceptable 
outcome without normative unanimity, while Mansbridge et al (2010) suggest four forms of 
legitimate communicative agreement short of strong consensus. 
Modifying the ideal of consensus in this way may seem to resolve our suggested paradox 
of consensus. For the paradox to be troubling to deliberative theory, consensus must be 
attainable and desirable. However, we shall argue that both ‘strong consensus’ and ‘modified 
consensus’ approaches to deliberative democracy should regard the consensus paradox as a 
normative problem and empirical possibility. 
  
Following Bächtiger et al (2010), we may consider consensus an ideal constitutive of 
deliberative processes. A common ground for theories of deliberative democracy is what Dennis 
Thompson (2008, 498) calls ‘a reason-giving requirement’: Everyone involved in the 
deliberative process is expected to justify the laws they would impose on one another by giving 
reasons. If you give reasons intended to justify your positions to others, you manifest an aim to 
persuade others (Larmore 1990, 347). Consequently, since everyone is required to justify their 
position to everyone else in the deliberative process, all participants aim to reach consensus 
based on their own arguments. In other words: To justify something is, implicitly, to raise a 
claim that consensus should be based on the arguments of which the justification consists. We 
need not believe literally ’that we are going to achieve consensus on some controversial matter’ 
as Michael Neblo (2007, 536) puts it, ‘but we have to act as if we could achieve consensus in 
order to make sense of rational deliberation as rational’, for otherwise, ‘[i]f we are really just 
trafficking in our personal prejudices with no hope of reasonable persuasion, then deliberation 
hardly has a strong claim on us over standard models of aggregative democracy’. However, the 
reason-giving requirement implies not only that consensus should be based on your own 
arguments, but also that you should abandon your argument if you fail to demonstrate why the 
best available argument should be rejected. Argumentative rationality ‘means that the 
participants in the discourse are open to be persuaded by the better argument’ (Risse 2004, 294). 
To conclude, the reason-giving requirement implies an ideal of consensus, by stipulating that 
participants should adhere to the best available argument, regardless of whether it is theirs or 
somebody else’s, and seek to persuade others to do the same. 
This argument, however, might not impress proponents of deliberative democracy who, 
deeming the ideal of consensus to be unfeasible or unlikely in pluralistic societies, have sought 
to replace it with alternative notions of legitimate outcomes. Yet, even to these immanent 
critics, the consensus paradox remains a troubling possibility. 
First, one should not overstate the incompatibility between the ideal of consensus and the 
reality of diversity. On the one hand, critics of consensus often seem to exaggerate the 
  
intractability of deep disagreement in pluralist societies. While cultural diversity may imply 
challenges for (deliberative) democracy, it is rarely reducible to irreconcilable moral values or 
incommensurable conceptual frameworks; rather, it entails multi-dimensional conflicts of a 
political kind that deliberative democracy aims to settle ‘in ways that make it possible for one to 
reasonably accept their outcome.’ (Bohman 2003, 96; cf. Deveaux 2003) On the other hand, 
some adherents of rational consensus seem to dispel it too far into ideal theory. For instance, on 
some Habermasian interpretations, ‘no actually existing settlement can constitute a satisfactory 
embodiment of the regulative idea of agreement’ (Markell 1997, 378f). But to deny that 
consensus could ever be acceptably achieved seems to rob the ideal of much of its normative 
force and heuristic utility (cf. Brady 2004). 
Second, even agonist critics (e.g. Mouffe 2005, 31) concede that there is some role for 
consensus and agreement in a liberal democracy, even if it just results from a provisional 
stabilization of power. More importantly, many theorists within the deliberative programme, 
who recognize the impracticability of consensus, still seem to hold that deliberation should 
preferably produce normative agreement or moral compromise (cf. Deveaux 2003, 785). Such 
fall-back solutions imply striving for greater agreement. For instance, Mansbridge et al (2010, 
68, 70) claim that ‘the goal at the outset of deliberation ought not necessarily to be a substantive 
consensus’, but still suggest that deliberative processes end ‘in a kind of consensus, that is, a 
genuine agreement among participants that the outcomes are right or fair.’ Thus, these modified 
legitimate outcomes may be construed as non-ideal approximations of the abstract ideal, which 
still accept the view that consensus is ideally desirable but, given its impracticality, not 
necessary for democratic legitimacy. 
Some of these difficulties may be resolved by conceiving of consensus as an ideal that can 
be realized to greater or lesser degrees in actual agreements (cf. Thompson 2008, 505). Actual 
outcomes may be ordered according to their deliberative legitimacy or desirability along a 
dimension, with modus vivendi or political compromise at one extreme, and at the other 
normative unanimity or rational consensus, with various conceptions of modified consensus 
  
someplace in between. This scalar conception may resonate with both the notion of consensus 
as a regulative ideal, the realization that it is variably attainable under real circumstances, and 
the openness to a variety of legitimate outcomes and second-order agreements. Regarding 
rational consensus as a matter of degree may also make the concept more useful for empirical 
study. And to the degree that consensus is achieved, the paradox potentially results: The more 
the outcome approaches consensus, the greater the risk of detrimental effects on subsequent 
deliberations.  
The paradox of consensus 
Given that deliberative democracy must ensure favourable conditions for rational public 
discourse even after reaching a closure, core claims in deliberative democratic theory generate 
seemingly contradictive implications. First, if deliberation among people who differ promotes 
rationality in collective decision-making, then we should expect the rationality-promoting effect 
of deliberation to end, or at least weaken, once the deliberative procedure stops. Second, to the 
extent that a deliberating group successfully reaches the aim of a full, rational consensus, its 
members will no longer be situated in the ‘circumstances of deliberation’, since ‘some basic 
disagreement is necessary to create the problem that deliberative democracy is intended to 
solve’ (Thompson 2008). Taken together, these assumptions lead to what we claim is a dilemma 
or a paradox of consensus in deliberative democratic theory: Rational, deliberative opinion 
formation aims at consensual agreement, but consensus as such will likely negatively affect the 
conditions for future rational public discourse. 
In recent academic debates about consensus in deliberation, both normative and empirical 
scholars have focused on the process leading up to a collective decision, treating consensus as a 
prospective goal, but few have studied how an agreement approximating consensus, once 
established as a matter of fact, structures the conditions for future deliberation. This neglect is 
unfortunate, because reaching an agreement does not eliminate the need to argue in support of a 
policy position or a decision.  
  
Deliberative democratic theory underscores that agreements and decisions must constantly 
be subject to scrutiny and revision through deliberation (Benhabib 1994, 33). Agreements are 
perishables, made at specific points in time by specific parties, who may need to reconsider their 
agreement on specific issues as circumstances change. For one thing, new information might 
challenge the plausibility of the arguments supporting an agreement on a certain issue, and 
should trigger revisions of the arguments in order to maintain the rationality of the agreement. 
Hence, arguments once taken to be rational may lose their rationality over time, in light of new 
information, and thus, agreements can ever be considered finally settled.
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 Likewise, agreements 
must be reconsidered as new persons – immigrants or new generations, for instance – become 
subject to authoritative decisions which they have not participated in making, following the oft-
cited all affected principle (Gutmann and Thompson 2000, 161). The consensus paradox implies 
that revisions, in light of new circumstances, may occur under less favourable conditions, if a 
previously established agreement has hampered or halted deliberation on these issues (cf. 
Deveaux 2003, 794). 
Moreover, a consensus on one discrete issue might undermine the preconditions for 
rationality in other issues, for instance if an inference underlying a decision on one issue is 
relevant for decision making on another issue. Suppose that a parliament comes to a consensual 
agreement about prohibiting abortion due to the (assumed) human status of the embryo. The 
abortion agreement is not contested ex post, but as time goes by, another related issue is raised: 
Is it legally permissible to expend human embryos for research? Of course, the argument about 
the human status of the embryo is relevant for this issue too, but since the argument was not 
contested after the decision on abortion, the preconditions for a rational decision regarding 
human embryo research are not as good as they would have been, had the argument been 
contested. Consequently, the detrimental effects of consensus on rationality could be contagious 
across a range of related issues. 
  
The causal mechanisms: Stagnation, forgetfulness and conformism 
So far, we have argued that there is a tension over time in deliberative democratic theory 
between, on the one hand, the ideal of rational consensus, and, on the other hand, the 
assumption that diversity in deliberation produces more rational decisions. In order to further 
substantiate this claim, we suggest three cognitive and socio-psychological mechanisms: 
Stagnation, forgetfulness and conformism. 
1. Stagnation: Many theories of deliberation emphasise its potential to trigger processes of 
learning, moral development and preference transformation among participants (Doheny 
and O’Neill 2010) or that deliberation under conditions of diversity may generate new 
perspectives and novel reasons (Bohman 2006). If deliberation stalls, such generative 
processes also would seem to come to an end. Reaching a consensus results in a 
homogenous set of opinions, where the conditions for deliberating are presumably worse 
than where opinions are more heterogeneous (Ryfe 2005, 52). If disagreement fuels 
political debate, replacing it with consensus will likely cause deliberative activities to 
stagnate. Consequently, we should expect less improvement of rational public discourse 
compared to a situation with more disagreement, when the same issue is raised again.  
2. Forgetfulness: Not only might a closure of deliberation lead parties to cease developing 
new arguments in favour of their preferred policy option, they will most likely forget 
existing ones, too. In the words of John Stuart Mill (1991, 59): 
even if the received opinion be not only true, but the whole truth; unless it is 
suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously and earnestly contested, it will, by 
most of those who receive it, be held in the manner of a prejudice, with little 
comprehension or feeling of its rational grounds. 
That is, unless others continuously challenge your opinion, and unless you are compelled 
to defend it publicly, in order to convince an audience, you will have little reason to recall 
  
and refine the reasons in support of your view. In order for people to remember an 
argument, they need to spend time actually contemplating it, for instance by constructing 
counter-arguments for themselves (Goodin 2000; Goodin and Niemeyer 2003; Lupia 
2002). This ‘deliberation within’, a process through which people try out and test 
arguments for themselves, will probably be more active if their view meets contestation. 
By contrast, absent such opposition, people who embrace the dominant view will be more 
likely to forget arguments (cf. Pingree 2006). And to the extent that people forget 
arguments, the conditions for a rational public discourse will also necessarily decline, so 
this mechanism might be self-reinforcing.  
3. Conformism: Finally, people’s fear for being different or deviant could explain why a 
massive consensus could threaten the rationality of public discourse. A series of classical 
experiments in social psychology demonstrate that people are strongly inclined to conform 
to what they take to be a prevailing norm. For instance, in Solomon Asch’s (1951; cf. 
Larsen 1990; Schneider and Watkins 1996) conformity experiments, test subjects 
increasingly tended to provide incorrect answers to trivial, obvious factual questions, after 
confederates of the experiment unanimously had given wrong answers. On an aggregate 
level, this conformist inclination has been confirmed by partial empirical support for the 
so-called spiral of silence thesis.
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 According to this thesis, people who deviate from what 
they take to be the majority view on a certain political issue tend to suppress their opinion, 
while those who think the majority agrees with them are more inclined to state their view 
publicly, which initiates a self-reinforcing spiral effect, as majority supporters speak out 
while minority supporters increasingly stay silent. Hence, this fear of deviating from what 
one takes to be the social norm may risk impinging on the free exchange of ideas and 
opinions, which is the very kernel of deliberation, and thus, it may also hamper the 
rationality of public discourse. Indeed, Gerry Mackie (2006, 285) calls this human 
inclination not to deviate from prevailing norms a ‘non-rational conformism’.  
  
As such, argumentative stagnation, forgetfulness and conformism represent three plausible 
causal mechanisms explaining why a massive consensus might impede the rationality of future 
public discourses. While these mechanisms probably interact, they are analytically distinct. The 
first mechanism, stagnation, reflects assumptions about the value of deliberation within 
deliberative theory: If one believes that deliberation promotes rationality, then, as a matter of 
consistency, one should also believe that less deliberation, which logically follows after 
consensual closure, would negatively affect the rationality of public discourse. In contrast, the 
two other mechanisms, forgetfulness and conformism, are based on cognitive and social 
psychology and are not derived exclusively from within deliberative democratic theory. They 
might therefore seem less consequential for the theory, but to the extent that they occur in real 
deliberation, the effects may be more dramatic, since they not only weaken the improvement of 
arguments (as the mechanism of stagnations does), but also undermine the use of existing 
arguments. If mechanisms of forgetfulness and conformism are triggered by consensus, people 
will forget the reasons that justified the consensual agreement, or fear to challenge them 
critically, which means that further deliberation not only fails to improve the rationality of 
public discourse, but also that consensus decreases rationality over time. 
Our argument about the consensus paradox innovatively departs from two types of 
previous critiques of deliberative theory because we offer an endogenous explanation of the 
detrimental effects of consensus-oriented deliberation. First, one strand of criticism has 
suggested that consensus-oriented deliberation may serve ideological purposes by reproducing 
pre-existing social inequality, marginalization and hierarchies. ‘When hegemonic discourse 
operates’, writes Young (2001, 685), ‘parties to deliberation may agree on premises … yet the 
premises and terms of the account mask the reproduction of power and injustice.’ Sanders 
(1997, 362) similarly suggests that ‘where there are gross inequities in power and status, calling 
for compromise may be perilously close to suppressing the challenging perspectives of 
marginalized groups.’ Certainly, disparities in wealth, power and status may severely distort 
deliberation. Our argument, however, relies neither on sociological assumptions about external, 
  
social conditions nor on a notion of false consent, in order to explain why consensus could 
hamper rational dialogue, and therefore, from the point of view of deliberative theory, it seems 
more parsimonious and challenging.  
A second strand of criticism questions deliberative democratic theory’s assumption that 
public deliberation produces epistemically better outcomes than non-deliberative procedures. 
These critics argue that while groups sometimes outperform individuals and while groups of lay 
persons sometimes outperform individual experts in producing good epistemic outcomes, 
deliberation within groups will not necessarily make them collectively smarter. To the contrary, 
Cass Sunstein (2005) argues that group deliberation can serve to polarise opinions among group 
members in a way that does not improve the rationality of their collective opinion-formation. 
Likewise, James Surowiecki (2005) warns that too much communication can make groups less 
intelligent, as it makes members less independent and furthers groupthink, so that the group as a 
whole does not take advantage of the comparative advantages of individual group members. 
Outright rejecting deliberation, Hibbing & Theiss-Morse (2002, 191) claim that it ‘can lead to 
worse decisions than would have occurred if no deliberation had taken place’. 
However, these doubts about public deliberation have limited implications for our present 
purposes. First, the sceptics’ warnings about the negative effects of deliberation are in line with 
our argument, as we hypothesise that discord and heterogeneity among deliberants imply 
comparative advantages in terms of rationality in public deliberation. Second, empirical 
research on deliberation tends actually to support the deliberative democratic claim about the 
epistemic effects of deliberation, although this conclusion is hedged with reservations (Gastil 
and Dillard 1999; Ryfe 2005). Hence, on empirical grounds, we can assume that increased 
deliberation will improve the rationality of public political discourse. Third, given that the 
consensus paradox can be deduced from assumptions in deliberative theory, its problematic 
theoretical implications for deliberative democracy do not depend on whether deliberation 
actually promotes rationality. 
  
To conclude, we believe that our argument about the consensus paradox represents a 
novel, original issue in deliberative theory, as it points to a tension between core assumptions 
which becomes visible once we model consensus-oriented deliberation as an iterated process. 
The consensus paradox and empirical research 
The consensus paradox is not just a theoretical puzzle, but suggests that making 
agreements in consensus will affect the rationality of subsequent public discourse – a testable, 
empirical proposition. In this section, we survey existing research and suggest methods by 
which to assess whether the consensus paradox actually occurs in small-group experiments as 
well as in real-world deliberative situations. 
Given how central the ideal of consensus is for deliberation and decision making, it 
features in plenty of empirical studies on a micro level (for an overview, see Kerr and Tindale 
2004). Using experimental designs as well as natural groups, this line of research examines 
deliberation and decision-making in small groups (for an overview, see Gastil 2010) and 
typically asks how the procedural requirement to make decisions consensually impacts on 
deliberation and decision-making.
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 Several studies support our hypothesis that consensus 
negatively affects rationality (see for example Postmes, Spears, and Cihangir 2001; Schweiger, 
Sandberg, and Ragan 1986; Tung 1993). In his meta-analysis of this literature, Charles Schwenk 
(1990, 161) states that ‘[a] large body of research demonstrates that conflict can improve 
decision quality’. However, by focusing exclusively on consensus as a prospective end-state of 
deliberation, this line of empirical research on how consensus as a goal affects deliberation only 
includes the process leading up to a decision, but not in the deliberative sequence following 
after an agreement. Here, we see fruitful opportunities for exploring whether a consensus 
agreement in itself influences the rationality of subsequent deliberation, for instance by the 
mechanisms of stagnation, forgetfulness and conformism, when a group meets after some time 
to discuss the same issue again. 
  
A related line of research on a macro level examines how the degree of polarisation on a 
political issue affects opinion formation in real-world policy debates. In their study of 
parliamentary debates, Steiner et al (2004) construct a Discourse Quality Index, which 
measures, among other things, how well members of parliament justify and give reasons for 
their policy positions (cf. Bächtiger et al. 2005; Steenbergen et al. 2003). According to Steiner’s 
et al results, parliamentarians give better reasons for their positions on issues that are non-
polarised than they do on issues where opinions are strongly polarised. Explaining this result, 
Steiner et al argue that parliamentary politicians are more oriented towards pragmatic 
cooperation on non-polarised issues, which in turn forces them to give more thorough reasons 
for their positions. 
Our consensus paradox thesis may seem to be contradicted by Steiner’s et al empirical 
finding that discourse quality increases when issues are less polarised. However, there are 
important differences: First, Steiner et al study the quality of deliberation leading up to a 
decision, while our argument concerns the rational quality of the opinion-formation processes 
that follow after a deliberative agreement, and thus their empirical results, strictly speaking, do 
not pertain to the paradox. Second, our explanatory model is compatible with theirs, since we do 
not claim that the preconditions for rational opinion-formation improve the more polarised the 
debate. For instance, politicians have only weak incentives to justify publicly their positions on 
strongly polarised issues, as they have little reason to believe that they will be able to convince 
their opponents on such issues. Moreover, the distinction between polarised and non-polarised 
issues is not exhaustive. A high degree of unanimity, not to be confused with non-polarisation, 
may undermine the preconditions for rational deliberation. What happens when the non-
polarised condition in a debate – which still can accommodate contradictory opinions – 
transforms into unanimity? Theoretically, it seems improbable that the positive effect upon 
political debates remains.
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Hence, while existing empirical studies of deliberation provide important pieces to our 
puzzle, the consensus paradox as such has not yet been tested in empirical research. In the 
  
following, we suggest methods by which to test whether the paradox can be observed in small-
group experiments as well as in real-world deliberative processes, such as parliamentary 
debates. 
Testing the paradox in experiments and real-world deliberation 
Many studies of deliberation in general and consensus more specifically are based on 
small group discussions in experimental settings (Mendelberg 2002; Renz 2006). These studies 
are marred with an important limitation: the outcome of deliberation in such settings usually 
makes no real practical difference for the parties involved. And sometimes, as in Fishkin’s oft-
cited deliberative experiments, the participants are not even asked to make a collective decision 
at all (Thompson 2008, 503). Still, an experimental research design provides crucial tools for 
testing the hypothesis that consensus negatively affects rationality. By simulating deliberation 
on a set of policy issues in small-group settings over time and by manipulating circumstances of 
importance for the emergence of consensus, experiments allow for drawing more robust 
conclusions about causality.    
The obvious alternative to experiments is to study whether the consensus paradox occurs 
in real-world public deliberation, for instance in parliamentary assemblies. While discussion and 
debate in parliaments and similar forums may seem distant from the ideals of deliberative 
discourse, they offer opportunities to study deliberation under circumstances where its outcome 
really matters, in contrast to the deliberative outcome in experimental settings. Moreover, 
operating with a low threshold, one may regard deliberation as any cognitive process where 
actors form and express opinions through argumentation (Habermas 1996; Wessler 2008; Simon 
and Xenos 2000). Additionally, deliberation can be more or less complete (Fishkin 1997, 41; cf. 
Bächtiger et al. 2010); that is, opinions can be more or less formed and expressed through 
argumentation. Hence, parliamentary arenas contain elements of deliberation, even as they are 
more or less far away from the ideals of deliberative democratic theory. In real political life, 
deliberation is always imperfect (Grimes 2008; Gastil 2006).  
  
Specifying the consensus paradox hypotheses 
In order to derive falsifiable mid-range propositions from our general theoretical claim (cf. 
Mutz 2008), we propose a weak and a strong version of the consensus paradox hypothesis. The 
weak hypothesis only expects the mechanism of stagnation to set in, whereas the strong 
hypothesis additionally assumes forgetfulness and/or conformism to be operative. 
 H1 (weak): The more an agreement on a policy issue approximates consensus, the less will 
subsequent public discourse on that issue improve rationality. 
 H2 (strong): The more an agreement on a policy issue approximates consensus, the less 
rational will subsequent public discourse on that issue be. 
The weak hypothesis does not imply that a highly consensual agreement decreases the 
rationality of subsequent public discourse, only that it hampers the development of new 
arguments compared to a situation where the prior agreement was less consensual. After having 
reached a highly consensual agreement, participants cease developing better arguments or 
elaborating the ones they already have in subsequent debates – they just repeat existing 
arguments. Thus, renewed deliberation preserves but does not improve the rational quality of 
public discourse. Vice versa, on issues where the prior agreement was less consensual, we 
would expect participants to be more innovative in developing better arguments and elaborating 
existing arguments.  
To test the weak hypothesis in parliamentary arenas, we propose a research design based 
on the logic of minimal variation, comparing cases of public policy debates that differ only with 
regard to the level of consensual agreement over time. The hypothesis would be confirmed to 
the extent that the result demonstrates that renewed deliberation leads to less improvement of 
rationality in cases with highly more consensual agreement than in cases with less consensual 
agreement. 
  
The strong hypothesis more boldly states that consensus decreases rationality over time. 
That is, after a highly consensual agreement, we expect participants to forget arguments and 
knowledge about the issue, and/or to conform to the previously established consensual norm for 
non-rational reasons, in subsequent public discourse on the same issue. Conversely, on issues 
where the previous agreement was less consensual, we would expect participants to remember 
more arguments and knowledge about the issue at stake, and be more inclined to speak out if 
they dissent from the prior agreement. 
To test the strong hypothesis, we propose a longitudinal design comparing the rational 
quality of public discourse over time on policy issues where the degree of consensual agreement 
has varied. The hypothesis would be corroborated if the result demonstrates that the rationality 
of public discourse decreases on issues where a prior agreement was highly consensual, and 
vice versa. In order to make the result more robust, the longitudinal design could be 
complemented with a broader sample of public discourses on policy issues exhibiting varying 
degrees of consensual agreement over time, across different institutional settings, in order to 
control for effects of, for example, electoral system, party system and political culture. 
Additionally, sampling cases from deliberative arenas other than parliaments could help 
corroborating the results, provided the degree of consensual agreement varies over time.  
Both hypotheses could also be tested by experiments in small-groups deliberating on 
policy issues at two points in time. By distributing participants to groups on the basis of their 
attitude to a certain policy issue at the first session, we can assure variation in the degrees of 
opinion homogeneity between groups. By assigning each group to discuss and reach a collective 
decision on the policy issue and then to justify their decision in writing, the necessary data for 
analysing the rationality of the group’s decision will be provided. Adding some information of 
relevance for the decisions in the first session, the procedure will be repeated at a second 
session. Consequently, this design allows for examining whether the strength of agreement in 
the first session affected the rationality of discussions in the second session, and thereby tests 
the weak as well as the strong hypothesis.  
  
While the repeated-measures design described above may discriminate between stagnation 
and forgetfulness, it may reveal less on the role of conformity. Therefore, it needs to be 
complemented by an experimental design in which the degree of conformity as an independent 
variable is manipulated. This can be done by assigning the role of a devil’s advocate to one or 
more group members in half of the groups (Kerr and Tindale 2004; Schwenk and Valacich 
1994). This design can straightforwardly test whether disagreement in the discussions promotes 
rationality, and thus whether the weak hypothesis holds true. 
Assessing outcome rationality 
Rationality is a complex concept used in several ways in deliberation research: it may, 
roughly, refer to (1) the cognitive capacity of individuals (Goodin 2000) or collective persons 
(Pettit 2001) to use reason in forming a judgment or decision; (2) the norms regulating 
deliberative procedures or the logics governing different modes of social interaction (Bohman 
1998; Blau 2011); or (3) the epistemic quality of the collective decisions or judgments resulting 
from deliberation (Cooke 2000, 952). Here, we focus on devising empirical tests for outcome 
rationality (3) following a mixed-methods approach.  
According to our hypotheses, consensus impedes the rationality of public discourse by 
hampering the development of new arguments and/or undermining the quality of existing ones. 
Hence, we need to specify how to measure the degree to which deliberants offer reasons for 
their positions. Generally, one could measure the expected effects of the mechanisms behind our 
hypotheses – i.e., stagnation, forgetfulness and conformism – quantitatively or qualitatively, 
since we expect reasons to become fewer and arguments to become weaker in the shadow of 
consensus. 
The existing literature suggests various ways to quantitatively measure individual or 
collective reason-giving in different contexts, but need tweaking to fit the diachronic logic of 
our argument. Employing the toolset of argumentation analysis, one could map the arguments 
(cf. Nanz and Steffek 2005) and then use numerical measures to test (H2) whether deliberants 
  
present fewer reasons when they reopen an issue some time after a consensus decision, or, 
respectively, (H1) whether they present fewer reasons on issues more dominated by consensual 
agreement than on issues less so dominated. One example is the ‘level of justification’ (Steiner 
et al. 2004), which measures the number of reasons speakers offer in support of their position. 
This measure may give a crude indicator of whether the mechanisms are at work: Ceteris 
paribus, i.e., holding constant the quality and consistency of the reasons, a position would seem 
weaker the fewer reasons that support it. A second example, the ‘argument repertoire’ 
(Cappella, Price, and Nir 2002), includes both the number of reasons for a position and the 
number of reasons for the opposite position. Adapted for collective reasoning, ‘argument 
repertoire’ may allow testing our hypotheses, as a decline in stated contra reasons might 
indicate even stronger the causal mechanisms at work. These two examples, then, illustrate 
established measures of discourse quality that could be adapted for testing our hypotheses. 
Obviously, all such tests should be cautiously interpreted and complemented with qualitative 
analysis. 
To test whether the mechanisms also undermine the quality of arguments on an issue 
involves another host of difficulties. According to common argumentation theory, the quality of 
an argument is determined by the truth of the premises and the validity of the inference (Blair 
2012), and the consensus paradox could affect both. Given the problems involved in assessing 
empirically the plausibility of both normative and factual premises, we suggest that focusing on 
validity provides a sufficient and economical way to test the hypotheses (cf. Bächtiger et al. 
2010, 41; Steenbergen et al. 2003, 25). In general, it is difficult to assess the truth of the 
premises of political arguments, and the result is bound to be controversial. Moreover, testing 
our hypotheses by assessing truth turns out to be especially problematic, since external factors, 
such as the general availability of information, are likely to influence variation within and 
across contexts. By contrast, the validity of the inferences can be determined independently of 
external criteria of truth or goodness. Besides, examining validity is sufficient for examining our 
  
hypotheses: If consensus undermines the quality of existing arguments or hampers the 
development of new arguments, the validity of inferences would likely be impaired. 
How to measure the validity of inferences? We suggest that drawing on argumentation 
theory may advance methods for assessing the quality of arguments in public deliberation. In 
informal logic, validity means that the premises should be relevant to or support the conclusion 
(Groarke 1996; Govier 1995), but there is no distinct, general theory of how strong this support 
should be in order to be sufficient. Existing quantitative measures of deliberation quality (e.g. 
Steiner et al. 2004, 171ff; Cappella, Price, and Nir 2002, 77) leave coders some discretion in 
contextually interpreting the relevance of reasons. A stricter procedure for assessing the 
adequacy of support could employ a three-tiered test proposed by Anthony Blair (2012, 192). 
First, one looks for deductively valid inferences, i.e., where the premises entail the conclusion. 
Second, if the argument is not deductively valid, one asks whether the argument might be 
inductively strong, i.e., whether the conclusion is probably true given the premises. Third, if the 
argument fails the two first tests, one asks ‘whether in the circumstances the grounds support 
the proposition at issue on the basis of some other kind of rule of inference’. An example is the 
presumptive warrant (Walton 1996), where an argument scheme (e.g., argument from analogy, 
authority or slippery slope) shifts the burden of proof to the interlocutor, which can be assessed 
by running through a set of critical questions for each type of scheme.
5
 An argument which fails 
these three tests could reasonably be classified as inadequately supported by reasons. This 
method requires further elaboration, and is useful only if it ceteris paribus delivers more reliable 
results than the less intricate approaches. Still, sufficiency is inescapably contextual (Pinto 
2001, 27), which calls for a transparent reconstruction of arguments in order to ensure 
intersubjectivity. 
Is outcome rationality too narrow an operationalization of the broad concept of rationality 
in deliberative theory? Obviously, our operationalization does not exhaust all aspects of 
rationality and reasonableness. However, it reflects the notion of discursive rationality 
(Steenbergen et al. 2003) and deliberative democracy’s defining conceptual criterion of 
  
legitimacy as mutual justification, i.e, ‘presenting and responding to reasons intended to justify 
a political decision’ (Thompson 2008, 504). While the model we present in this paper is 
confined to the epistemic claim in deliberative democratic theory, we also see interesting 
possibilities for exploring ex post effects of consensus for sustaining the educative or 
transformative claims, i.e., the idea that democratic deliberation improves the participants’ 
moral, practical or intellectual qualities (Cooke 2000, 948) or induces them to transcend their 
private interests and identities. 
Theoretical implications of the consensus paradox 
If, as we have argued, deliberative democratic theory harbours a consensus paradox, so 
that the better parties approach consensus in their agreement, the worse the conditions over time 
for rational deliberation, what should be done? Could the dilemma be avoided or could its 
effects be mitigated? 
The consensus paradox is a matter of theoretical implication in deliberative democratic 
theory. Combined, the two assumptions that disagreement in deliberation promotes rationality in 
decisions and that deliberation should aim for consensus agreements seem to imply that 
rationality may be affected negatively to the degree that consensus is reached. This theoretical 
conundrum may be worthwhile to address in its own right, regardless of whether empirical 
studies, such as those we have suggested above, would corroborate the hypotheses that 
consensus makes future deliberation less rational. Yet, if one wishes to address the theoretical 
puzzle, one should still take such empirical studies into account, because, first, even if the 
results would support the hypotheses, the magnitude of detrimental effects of consensus on 
rationality is still important to consider in a theoretical approach. Second, and more 
fundamentally, empirical studies could falsify the paradox altogether since the seemingly 
conflicting assumptions in deliberative theory, which lead to the consensus paradox, may be 
false.  
  
A negative empirical result, falsifying both the strong and the weak hypothesis on the 
consensus paradox, might seem unproblematic for deliberative theory. However, a negative 
result might actually be quite troubling. The consensus paradox builds on a core claim in 
deliberative theory: That the quality of public opinion benefits from having a diverse and lively 
deliberative debate. However, if the cessation of deliberation has no effect on the rationality of 
public discourse, we need to reconsider a major empirical claim in deliberative democratic 
theory: that on-going public deliberation makes a difference. A negative result might thus seem 
to resonate with the critique against deliberation raised by sceptics such as Sunstein (2005), 
Surowiecki (2005) and Hibbing & Theiss-Morse (2002). Of course, one could still favour 
deliberation on grounds other than its epistemic benefits. 
However, even without empirical support, the theoretical puzzle of the consensus paradox 
still needs to be resolved, for two reasons. First, empirical studies of deliberation have tended to 
generate findings ‘mixed or inconclusive’, mainly because ‘the success or failure of deliberation 
depends so much on its context (Thompson 2008, 499). Consequently, it may be wise not to 
reject the value of deliberation based on empirical studies of the consensus paradox alone. 
Second, as we argue above, the consensus paradox exists in deliberative theory as a matter of 
implication, which means that the paradox is ontologically independent of empirical results. 
Hence, while empirical studies supporting the claim that consensus has a negative impact on 
rationality seem more urgent for deliberative democracy, the paradox’s theoretical implications 
merit consideration in their own right. 
A positive result, confirming that consensus negatively influences rationality in actual 
political debates, yields different theoretical implications for deliberative democratic theory. 
Dennis Thompson gives a sort of value pluralist defence of deliberative democracy, in arguing 
that we should recognise that the elements deliberative democracy seeks to promote may 
sometimes conflict with each other, in theory as in practice, and ‘that we have to make hard 
choices among them’ (Thompson 2008, 511). The consensus paradox points to such a potential 
conflict between fundamental values in deliberative democratic theory, but also in actual 
  
deliberative practice. Following existing approaches in deliberative research, one could seek to 
resolve the conflict by either, first, abandoning the ideal of consensus, and move in the direction 
of agonistic democracy, where argumentation does not serve to reconcile but to recognize 
conflicting interests and identities. Alternatively, second, one could seek to modify consensus 
into a more abstract ideal, and seek fall-back standards of legitimate decision-making under 
non-ideal conditions. A third strategy would, instead, accept the paradox, but seek to mitigate its 
effects, by incorporating into deliberative democratic theory practices and institutions which 
reduce the risk, after an agreement, that people stop exercising or forget arguments or conform 
to the dominant view. Existing research in this area tends to focus on how to design equitable, 
inclusive and fair deliberative procedures. However, the consensus paradox indicates why such 
ex ante measures may be insufficient. Ensuring deliberative rationality over time might require 
provisions in the ex post phase, too, empowering institutions or individuals to recurring 
contestation or to dissent from the consensus view. In micro settings, such measures may 
include devil’s advocacy or dialectical inquiry (Schwenk 1990). At the macro level, institutional 
safeguards of rationality may include judicial review (Zurn 2007), monitoring and 
accountability agencies (Rosanvallon 2008), conscientious exemption (Ceva 2011), 
whistleblowing or civil disobedience. Thus, the consensus paradox points to the importance of 
integrating the epistemic benefits of such institutions into deliberative democratic theory. 
Conclusion 
This paper has explored a previously neglected theoretical puzzle at the heart of deliberative 
democratic theory: The possible conflict over time between consensus and rationality. In short, 
the more an agreement approaches the ideal of a rational consensus, the worse the conditions 
will be ex post for rational deliberation. While this paradox is demonstrable in deliberative 
theory, we have also suggested cognitive and social-psychological mechanisms – stagnation, 
forgetfulness and conformism – that may account for the paradox in practice. Moreover, this 
  
paper has served to open a research agenda for examining this puzzle empirically, that is, for 
studying whether consensus-like agreement actually decreases the rationality of future 
deliberation. Ideally, the paradox should be studied both under the controlled circumstances of 
small-group experiments and in the messier real-world public deliberative arenas where actual 
political agents make binding collective decisions. Finally, the paper has addressed the possibly 
dramatic implications for deliberative democratic theory of the tension between rationality and 
consensus, and discussed strategies by which to handle or resolve the dilemma. If disagreement 
produces better deliberative agreements, how could that deliberative productivity be sustained 
over time, once disagreement has been turned into a robust, rational agreement? 
While the consensus paradox, as we have outlined it in this paper, sheds light on an 
underexplored conflict between fundamental values in deliberative democratic theory, it also 
addresses a long-standing concern in political thought that antedates the recent deliberative turn 
in democracy research (Aristotle 2009, bk. II:II; de Tocqueville 2006, bk. III:21; Mill 1991, 59): 
How to balance the good of robust, reasonable agreement against the bad of social conformism, 
or the good of continuous, open and public contestation against the bad of collective 
indecisiveness? Put differently, how to institutionalize public debate in democratic societies in 
order to promote rationality in public policy? The exercise of public power should be 
transparent and intelligible to citizens (Waldron 1987), a requirement of legitimacy that might 
be difficult to meet to the extent that broad agreements turn out to impede the rationality of 
public discourse over time. Hence, taking seriously the theoretical challenge of the consensus 
paradox will be pertinent for a broader tradition of democratic thought and practice. 
                                                     
1
 To illustrate: At time T, a group reaches an agreement constituted by the following conditional 
inference: ‘if A, B, C, D, then Z’. Now, at time T+1, they reach an agreement on another 
position in another issue, constituted by an inference which contains a negation of one of the 
premises in the former inference, e.g. ‘since X and not-A, therefore Y’. The agreement on the 
first issue becomes less rational at T+1 compared to T, unless further deliberation takes place in 
  
                                                                                                                                                           
order to revise the first inference in the light of the content of the second inference (cf. 
Gärdenfors 1992).  
2
 (Neuwirth, Frederick, and Mayo 2007; Priest 2006; Kim 2004; Noelle-Neumann 1993) 
3
 (Coglianese 2003; Karpowitz and Mansbridge 2005; cf. Renz 2006; Schwenk and Valacich 
1994; Vanlear and Mabry 1999) 
4
 Cf. Nir (2011), who documents similar detrimental effects of consensus on participation. 
5
 For applications in various fields, see e.g. (Jiménez-Aleixandre and Erduran 2007 (science 
education); Verheij 2003 (law); Bench-Capon and Dunne 2007 (artificial intelligence)) 
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